Missile Defense's Real Enemy: Math

Stretching back several decades, the concept of missile defense has-been hotly alloted. Some scholars argue well Reasoned que le United States and other countries need Such deterrence breaks down defenses incase year or irrational actor gets Their finger on the nuclear trigger. Others argue missile defenses That are a waste of money Given That They Are Easily Defeated, and defensive technology will always stay behind the curve - never ready for primetime.

Both sides Have logical arguments. For the record, I am an advocate of missile defense - under some conditions. With various nations all over the planet purchasing or ballistic and cruise Developing weapons, defenses against weaponry Such are vital - Especially for the American navy in the form of Aegis missile defenses. When it comes to missile defense in nuclear matters-I have some shall we say, complex views. For regimes Such as Iran, North Korea and others is not rationality sometimes When Their Strongest follows - missile defense all the way. When it comes to larger nations with missile arsenals Such as China or Russia, I am not sold - yet.


There is however one thing you can not argue against, simple math.

Case in point, take a look at a recent book by Dr. Toshi Yoshihara chapter in Chinese Aerospace Power (a really good book, China defense geeks I am talking to you - it's a classic - get your credit card out) from our friends over at the Chinese Maritime Studies Institute.

Dr. Yoshihara Rating:
"ASBMs (anti-ship ballistic missiles) may not need to Produce Mission kills against the surface of fleet to complicate U.S. plans. They only need to reach the fleet's defensive envelope for the Aegis to commit the incoming terrorism threats, Malthus forcing the defender to expend valuable That ammunition cannot be Easily resupplied at sea under battle conditions. ASBMs Even inaccurate, then, compel Could the Aegis weapons icts to exhaust inventory, leaving it defenseless against further Top PLA actions. conjunction with conventional Used in ballistic missile strikes against U.S. bases and other land targets across Asia - That Would elicit more strikes intercept Attempts - Could ASBM raids deprive the United States and Its Allies of Their staying power in a sea fight. "

Such a spot raises a larger question. American commanders will face off in the future missile force Aimed at Their ships That just simply can overwhelm defenses through sheer Their numbers?

Another example comes from a 2011 report from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis Entitled Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Iran's Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats ( A2/AD geeks, this is truly a must read ) . In sketching out a scenario for a campaign can A2/AD Iranian Between 2020-2025, the authors explain:

"Iran Could icts deploy land-based ASCMs (anti-ship cruise missiles) from hardened and camouflaged firing positions to locations along icts coastline and on Iranian-occupied islands in the Strait of Hormuz while Placing false decoys at firing positions to complicate U.S. counterstrikes. Hundreds of ASCMs may cover the Strait, awaiting target cueing data from coastal radars, UAVs, surface vessels, submarines and. Salvo attacks and multiple axis Could thesis ASCMs enable U.S. to saturate defenses ... salvos of less able ASCMs might be used to exhaust U.S. defenses , paving the way for more advanced attacks by missiles. "

Think about it - could we someday see a scenario Where American Forces at sea with a fixed Amount of Defensive Countermeasures facing enemy with large numbers year of cruise and ballistic weapons That Have the potential to simply overwhelm them? Could a potential adversary fire off older weapons are not as accurate That issue, causing a defensive response That exhausts all available missile interceptors so more advanced weapons with better accuracy the crushing blow CAN DELIVER?

Simply put: does math win?

Truth be told, this is a very simplistic way of looking at the classic vs missile. missile-interceptor game. Many complex scenarios Could be Easily Envisioned. Sea-based forces, on the defensive Would Likely Employ multiple methods to secure Themselves. Jamming of missile and land-based guidance systems, missile launchers counterstrikes on enemy and attacks on enemy command and control all Would Likely be employed on some level offensive missiles are Launched oz. Preemptive strikes Could aussi be employed if a credible threat of a launch was presumed. Not to mention be land-based interceptors available Could be in the mix DEPENDING on the area of ​​hostilities as well as cyber and UAV strikes. And this says nothing about nuclear weapons ...

Yet, you Have to wonder, Does Math Have a say in Powerful Such a scenario. Considering the cost and missile defenses of vs. offensive missiles, "math" seems to have some valid arguments.