Failure Threatens Afghan Police Training Mission

Failure Threatens Afghan Police Training Mission

German officials have been training police in Afghanistan for a decade, but a visit to their training center in Mazar-e-Sharif creates major doubts about the effectiveness of the mission. Afghan police remain poorly prepared to tackle the mighty challenges they will face as Western forces withdraw.
The Afghan national sport is called buzkashi. It's a game in which horsemen battle over a goat carcass. There are no established teams.
During a match, the competitors forge brief, continuously shifting alliances. They only work together until they have gained a short-term advantage. The game can last for hours, even days. The winner is the rider who manages to carry the carcass to the goal. Buzkashi is a mirror of Afghan society.
By contrast, the German police officers who train local recruits in Afghanistan have brought soccer balls and nets to their base in Mazar-e-Sharif. Football is all about teamwork and team spirit. The goal is to form a team and achieve an objective together.
In a corner of the training center, on a patch of parched earth, there is now a soccer field where the next generation of Afghan police officers is learning the game.
"What we want to achieve with the recruits is a change in mentality," says a German instructor. More team spirit, a better sense of community, more loyalty. More soccer, less buzkashi.
Over the past 10 years, Germany has instructed some 56,000 Afghan police officers at four training centers in the region. The training is part of Germany's responsibility as a member of NATO, and so far the project has cost some €380 million ($503 million). As many as 200 German police officers are regularly stationed in Afghanistan, most of them in Mazar-e-Sharif.
But anyone who accompanies the German security aid workers for a few days is bound to doubt the mission's effectiveness after observing the mood among the officers and reading between the lines of official statements. Even now, when Western security forces have entered their 11th year of training, the police in Afghanistan don't stand for public order and security -- but rather for helplessness, arbitrariness and corruption.

A Prime Target
"The mission is neither effective nor sustainable," says Josef Scheuring, chairman of the Germany's largest police union, the GdP, adding that it endangers the lives of the German police officers. "We should withdraw from Afghanistan as quickly as possible," urges Scheuring. Nevertheless, police officers continue to work in the region, usually for a year. They are attracted by overseas bonuses of up to €200 per day.
Alex, 32, a mid-level police officer from the northeastern German town of Ueckermünde, is one of them. He is due to meet with Ayatullah at the Regional Police Training Center (RPTC) in Mazar-e-Sharif late in the afternoon. The next day, the 22-year-old low-ranking officer in the Afghan national police force will show class 6.2 how a road checkpoint works.
"Checkpoints are crucial," says Alex, adding that "they have a high death rate." This makes it important to teach "survival skills," as he puts it. Of all the uniformed officials in Afghanistan, police officers are at the highest risk.
Secluded from the outside world, many of them spend weeks at such checkpoints and are charged with representing the state. They are a symbol of the new Afghanistan, which is massively supported by the West -- and thus a prime target for insurgents. There are currently some 150,000 police officers in Afghanistan. Since 2002, when various Western nations launched training programs, it's estimated that nearly 10,000 police officers have been killed -- and some 15 percent desert the force every year.
Alex plans the next day with Ayatullah. "We'll meet at 7:50 a.m. in front of the armory, and by 8:20 a.m. the checkpoint will be set up. Is that enough time?" asks Alex.
"No problem," says Ayatullah.
"We need a patrol car and a civilian car, plus three boxes as barriers. Ideally, by this evening already. Is that okay?"
Ayatullah nods.
"Okay, I'll see you tomorrow," says Alex.
A Critical Phase
The ambitious project of developing an Afghan police force, which was to operate at least according to the basic principles of its German counterpart, began 10 years ago and involved three phases.
Phase 1, training recruits, was completed long ago.
Phase 2, instructing the police officers in practical operations on location, was abandoned last year. German police officers -- at the time still under the protection of German soldiers -- drove through the country for hours to call on various police stations. Since they had to be back before sundown due to security concerns, there often remained very little time for training.
Phase 3 is currently underway: Afghan police officers train Afghan recruits while the Germans monitor them. They correct mistakes and give suggestions. Based on the methodology and didactics of the German police school, it is hoped that the Afghans can train uneducated men to become good officers in just eight weeks.
Like all German police officers in Mazar-e-Sharif, Alex is living at Camp Marmal, the headquarters of the coalition troops in northern Afghanistan. The ISAF military base is one of the safest places in the country -- a well-equipped artificial world with shops, cafeterias, gyms and pool tables. Private security guards stand at the gates, while soldiers patrol outside the compound. A zeppelin floats in the sky, jam-packed with cameras and surveillance electronics.
The German police officers are not allowed to leave the camp. They used to accept invitations to eat meals with locals, were allowed to move about freely and had opportunities to get to know the country. Today, that would be unthinkable. The upcoming ISAF withdrawal has made the security situation extremely precarious.
Lieutenant General Rainer Glatz, the commander of all German military operations abroad, says that the mission in Afghanistan has reached a "critical phase." Glatz says the Afghan army and police will soon undergo a litmus test to see whether and how they can ensure security without outside help.
Part 2: A Certain Kind of Order
Alex from Ueckermünde begins his workday at 6:15 a.m. with breakfast in the air-conditioned canteen. At 7 a.m., he goes to the barracks where the German police have their offices. Some two dozen men and women have gathered there. They are wearing khaki-colored uniforms made of breathable fabrics with "vector protection," a special treatment that is designed to prevent bites from blood-sucking arthropods like ticks and flying insects.
A security briefing is part of the daily routine for the Germans at Camp Marmal. A colleague brings them up to speed: In Helmand Province, 15 men and 2 women were decapitated, allegedly because they had celebrated and danced; in Laghman Province in the east, two US soldiers were killed by Afghan military personnel. And in the north, where Camp Marmal is located, there were "no incidents."
That is no coincidence, because the north is under the control of Governor Atta Mohammed Noor. The former warlord is one of the richest men in the country. Every day, hundreds of supplicants wait for an opportunity to enter his office, which is decorated with chandeliers, paintings and silk upholstered chairs.
In the governor's realm, the opium smuggling trade is booming, as are alcohol sales and business with prostitutes from Tajikistan. The Western forces simply look the other way. Otherwise "the fragile economic system would collapse," said a US major during a confidential discussion behind the ISAF barracks.
Governor Noor stands for a certain amount of order. It is not the order that comes from the rule of law -- but it is enough for the German government to thank him with the construction of a new airport in Mazar-e-Sharif. A consulate general is due to be opened next year.
A Proud People
The RPTC training center is located roughly 800 meters (2,600 feet) from Camp Marmal. Before the Germans drive there, they each put on bulletproof vests, grab a G-36 assault rifle and climb into an armored SUV.
The Germans also carry their weapons on the secured military base. Their Afghan colleagues, however, must surrender their arms at the gate. An Afghan, a uniform and a loaded weapon can be a deadly combination in this part of the world. Some 50 ISAF soldiers have been shot by Afghans in uniform this year alone. The Taliban proudly boasts that it has managed to infiltrate the local police force. As a precautionary measure, the Kalashnikovs distributed to class 6.2 shortly before 8 a.m. are missing their firing pins. That way means any cartridges smuggled into the training center couldn't hurt anyone.
Ayatullah, the Afghan police instructor, has the checkpoint set up. "Where is the patrol car?" asks Alex, the German instructor.
Ayatullah hesitates. His superiors didn't want to hand over the car, he admits. He says they use it to drive home in the evening. They told him to tell the Germans that they would only make the vehicle available if they were given more gasoline.
His superiors are playing buzkashi with squad cars. As a result, class 6.2 practices without a vehicle.
Ayatullah assigns positions at the checkpoint. Four recruits secure the area, one stops an oncoming civilian car, and two others stand behind him. Stop, hands up, search the vehicle, make arrests.
Alex is not satisfied.
"Ayatullah should have explained the process once again to the entire class before the exercise, ideally at each individual stage," he says. Many of the recruits were not paying attention or didn't even understand which task had been assigned to them, he criticizes. Although Ayatullah has professional knowledge, he can't teach it to others, says the German.
At 10:15 a.m., the Afghan trainer and his German supervisor meet to review the session. "How did it go?" asks Alex.
"Really well," says Ayatullah, who is beaming.
Alex was expecting that answer. "Nevertheless, we have to talk about a few points," he says. The trick is to package the criticism so it sounds like praise. The Afghans are a proud people.
Running Out of Time
Eight weeks is not much time to make a police officer of a man who has perhaps never attended a school. The country's illiteracy rate is currently at roughly 70 percent, and sometimes the recruits don't understand a word, for instance, if an instructor tries to teach a group of Pashtuns in Dari. Only the most basic knowledge is taught: roadblocks, house searches, self-defense and making arrests, weaponry and a few legal principles, including human rights.
But is that enough?
Interior Minister for the northern German state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Lorenz Caffier, who also currently heads the German Interior Ministers' Conference, has his doubts. The problem is "that in Afghanistan we primarily train recruits for basic police service," says Caffier, "and we don't know how many of them will remain with the police force and how many will go to work for the warlords." The conservative politician, who is a member of Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU), says it would be preferable to train more senior officers who are less embedded in the country's old clan structures.
Not much time is left, though. By the end of February 2014, the number of German soldiers stationed in Afghanistan will have been reduced from the Bundeswehr's current force of nearly 4,500 to 3,300 -- and German combat troops will have been completely withdrawn by the end of 2014. German Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich of the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Bavarian sister party to the CDU, says that he intends "to consolidate what has been accomplished, even after 2014," adding that a "certain presence" by German police officers will be required in the region to achieve this.
But Alex and his colleagues on the ground in Afghanistan are asking themselves how long the camp will remain intact after the withdrawal. There is a great deal of concern that the training center will fall into disrepair, the air conditioning units will no longer be maintained, and that many items that can be used privately will quickly go missing. The establishment plan for the Afghan police does not include positions for maintenance workers.
Army Influence
After the lunch break, Alex turns his attention to another Afghan instructor: Tarek. This time the focus is on arrest and search techniques. Tarek stands confidently in front of the group, speaking loudly and gesticulating frequently. He also provides explanations, allows the recruits to practice individual steps and intervenes when necessary.
Then a recruit appears, wrapped in a large cloak with fuses visible from underneath. It's time to practice handling suicide bombers.
"Shout loudly to warn everyone around you, run backwards as quickly as possible and look for cover," explains Tarek.
"Only open fire if the insurgent attempts to detonate the bomb," Alex reminds them. Then he admits that only a bullet aimed at the head will help. "And quickly," he adds.
The day is over. Tarek collects empty water bottles and the recruits return to their living quarters. The Afghan head of the medical center at Camp Marmal climbs behind the wheel of his Ford Ranger. The colonel passes the checkpoints and takes the paved road toward the center of Mazar-e-Sharif. He drives for nearly 10 kilometers -- first through a desert-like landscape, then past garages, filling stations and shops. Shortly after entering the town, he turns left.
The car rumbles over a path through one of the city's better neighborhoods, where multi-story buildings are hidden from view behind high walls. Shortly before the medical officer reaches his own house, he passes by a corner property. Two men clad in Afghan army uniforms are trimming a hedge in the front garden. "A general lives here," the colonel explains.
The colonel is a member of the police force. He has to trim his own hedges -- at least as long as the Germans are still in Afghanistan.

Now even top officials in the Kabul government vow to kill Americans

The fate of the Americans in Afghanistan will be worse than that of the Russians,” Mohammed Ismail Khan warned in 2009. The same Afghan is now vowing to drive all “foreigners” out of Afghanistan.
More bluster from a Taliban leader? Hardly. Khan serves as Afghanistan’s energy minister, and is a key member of American ally Hamid Karzai’s cabinet.
In a videotaped meeting last month with jihadists in Herat Province, Khan slammed the US for bringing “American girls, white-skinned Western soldiers and black-skinned American soldiers” into Afghanistan. He called on the “mujahideen” to take up arms and attack them like they did the Soviet “invaders” in the 1980s.
Though his threatening remarks were quickly dismissed by the Afghan government, they should not be taken lightly — especially with American soldiers increasingly vulnerable to insider attacks by Afghans.                                              
Khan has lethal experience launching such attacks. In March 1979, Khan, then a captain in the Afghan army, orchestrated the murder of 50 Soviet military advisers and 300 of their family members in Herat Province. He decapitated many of them and had their heads paraded on spikes through the city.
The atrocity marked the opening salvo of the rebellion which led to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.
The US Army recently cited Khan’s treachery as an example of “green-on-blue attacks” that “were common and costly to the Soviet army” during its occupation of Afghanistan. It warned that Khan is “now the Afghan government’s minister of energy.”
The Army published the account in February 2012 and distributed it to soldiers serving in Afghanistan as part of an “Official Use Only” handbook, titled, “Inside the Wire Threats — Afghanistan.” The 35-page handbook also notes that Soviet attempts to train and stand up an Afghan army to fight insurgents failed miserably. “The Afghan army was an unreliable ally,” it said. “It faced constant defections from the start, as not only individuals and units but also whole divisions went over to the mujahideen, taking their personal kit and rifles as well as tanks and armored vehicles.”
Added the report: “The original Soviet plan to push the Afghan army into the field to combat the mujahideen fell by the wayside. The Afghan army’s limited numbers, lack of training, and questionable loyalties made this project too risky to implement.”

A 2011 Army survey found that “on average, US soldiers perceived that 50% of (the) ANA (Afghan National Army) were Islamic radicals” vulnerable to Taliban recruitment. The results were reported in an unclassified study titled, “A Crisis of Trust and Cultural Incompatibility.” It quotes one American soldier as saying, “A reporter attached to my platoon said that during a conversation with ANA soliders, they said that if the Taliban began to win the war, they would switch sides and join the Taliban.”
The crux of the Obama administration’s exit strategy has been training Afghan security forces to fight the Taliban and al Qaeda. Much of that training has been suspended due to rogue attacks and defections not unlike what the Soviets faced.
Afghan government troops and police — our allies — have turned their guns on US-led coalition troops at least 47 times this year, killing at least 63, most of them Americans. That’s more than double 2011’s total of 21 attacks, in which 35 were killed.
One recent attack involved for the first time an Afghan policewoman, who early last week drew her US-issued pistol and fatally shot a US military adviser in the chest at the police headquarters in Kabul. The police sergeant, a mother of four with a clean record, had earlier been a refugee in Iran.
Until 2005, Khan was governor of Herat Province, which borders Iran. He controlled border crossings and trade there. He also influenced local recruitment for Afghan security forces. Kabul recently accused Khan of illegally distributing weapons to his jihadi supporters in Herat. Although Khan says he would fight the Taliban if it returned to power, his own son-in-law recently joined the Taliban insurgency.
The US military seems to be in denial about the breadth and scope of theinternal threats it faces in Afghanistan. While on the one hand it warns that the “major problem confronting the Soviets was the unreliability of the Afghan army,” it nonetheless appears Polyannish about its own prospects for partnering with the Afghan army. “U.S. forces can gain keen insights and lessons from the Soviet 10-year occupation of Afghanistan,” the Army handbook asserts. The same document goes on to claim that “in contrast” to the Soviet experience, “the United States and CF (coalition forces) have achieved great success in training and partnering with our ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces) counterparts.”

1056 Afghan soldiers killed in 2012: Defense officials

The security transition from NATO troops to Afghan security forces which started last year is due to complete in five phases following a pre-planned organized program.

Despite Afghan security forces are in charge of over 75% of the Afghan soil security, Afghan officials are continuously expressing concerns regarding the lack of proper military equipments which creates challenges for the Afghan security forces.

In the meantime increased Afghan army troops casualties is another challenge being faced by Afghan national army where over 1000 service members have been killed during the year.

Afghan defense ministry spokesman Gen. Zahir Azimi on Sunday told reporters, “At least 906 Afghan national army soldiers have been killed during the past 9 months, and a total of 1056 Afghans troops have been killed during the year 2012 which shows an increase as compared to 2011.”

An Afghan military analyst Faqir Mohammad Faqir said increased attacks by militants is one of the main reason behind Afghan army casualties.

He said, “Whenever the other party involved in war increases activities then it will naturally increase the casualties but I think the Afghan troops should trained well, must be disciplined and equipped with modern weapons in a bid to reduce the growing casualties.”

Mr. Faqir also insisted that further works should be done in order to prevent Afghan army troops to lose their morale.

In the meantime NATO is looking to increase Afghan police and army numbers to 350,000 as the coalition troops are getting prepared to leave the country in 2014.

However Afghan and NATO officials are concerned regarding low morale of the Afghan security forces and troops escaping from their duties and growing insider attacks by Afghan troops on their international counterparts and comrades which creates barriers for the training of Afgahn security forces.

At least 60 NATO troops were killed by their Afghan counterparts during the year 2012.

All Of Afghanistan's Cargo Planes Are To be Scrapped

US scraps entire fleet of Afghan cargo planes

 The U.S. military is scrapping the Afghan air force’s entire fleet of Italian-made cargo planes, The Wall Street Journal reported Friday.

U.S. and Afghan officials told the paper that the Afghan military isn’t expected to have an independent and fully functioning air force until around 2017, well after the withdrawal of most U.S. and international troops.
On the west end of Kabul International Airport, twin-engine C-27As sit side by side, sunlight reflecting off their gray wings and the green, black, and red of the Afghan flag emblazoned on their tails. For more than a year, though, most of the planes had been little more than expensive aviation exhibitions, unable to fly due to lack of spare parts and maintenance.
Now, despite spending nearly $600 million on the program, the U.S. is canceling the contract for the aircraft and disposing of all 16 planes delivered to the Afghan Air Force, the Journal reported.

Alenia Aermacchi North America, a unit of Italian defense conglomerate Finmeccanica SpA, failed to meet the requirements of their contract to maintain the fleet, according to an email from U.S. Air Force spokesman Ed Gulick, who was quoted in the Journal.
“This decision comes after failed attempts by the contractor to generate a sufficient number of fully mission-capable aircraft that would provide an effective airlift capability for the AAF,” Gulick said in the email.
An Alenia representative was quoted in the Journal as saying the company had not received word of the decision and that the program had recently shown improvement.
“It’s all a bit surprising that this decision is being made now when the [remediation] plan is being fully implemented,” the representative said.
The entire fleet of C-27As was grounded in December 2011 and even recently only four to six planes have been able to operate at any one time, Afghan Air Force spokesman Col. Mohammad Bahadur said in an interview with Stars and Stripes.
“The basic problem is that these airplanes were purchased without spare parts,” Bahadur said. “For a small part, you need to wait for weeks or months.”
For the Afghan military, still struggling to operate independently, the lack of cargo aircraft has been a blow to an already shaky logistics system. The Afghan security forces have leaned heavily on their fleet of Russian helicopters and Cessna 208 planes. But those aircraft struggle to keep up with demand, especially on longer routes, such as the roughly 300-mile haul between the capital and Kandahar, Afghanistan’s second city and still a major center for fighting.
Shortages of fuel and parts are epidemic for Afghan troops, whose Humvees and pickups often lie dormant for days; many units complain of a shortage of ammunition.
The U.S. is set to deliver four C-130s, four-engine cargo planes that are the workhorses of the U.S. Air Force, to the Afghan Air Force in 2013, said Ministry of Defense spokesman Gen. Zahir Azimi said in an interview with Stars and Stripes.
“A military that doesn’t have a plane is like a man without legs,” Azimi said.
Stars and Stripes’ Heath Druzin and Zubair Babakarkhail contributed to this report.

 

Canadians in Afghanistan: what Operation Attention?

Nicolas Laffont is currently on assignment in Afghanistan with the Canadian Forces deployed for Operation Attention. 

For more than a decade that the Afghan war has begun and Canadians have been present since January 2002.

The combat mission in Kandahar which was based in the south of the country, ended in July 2011.

Since the present contingent of Canadian military declined to about 900 soldiers train Afghan security forces. This is what the military calls Operation Please note that the Canadian Contribution Training Mission - Afghanistan (CCFM-A).

Trainers, teachers, educators, advisors, ... In the context of this operation, Canada sent its military to provide support for training and professional development for national security forces of Afghanistan: Afghan National Army (ANA) Afghan Air Force (AAF) and the Afghan National Police (ANP).

The aim is to support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan when NATO troops leave the country in 2014.

The Government of Canada has allocated a budget of nearly $ 700 million per year between 2011 and 2014 (500 million military presence, 85 million for the installation and close the training mission and 100 million in aid and development ).

After a rotation 0 in July 2011 and one rotation in February 2012, is now the "roto" 2 to be in control.Feature of this deployment? They are almost all Quebecers.

In October and November, it is indeed nearly 870 soldiers who flew from the Jean-Lesage International Airport Quebec City to visit the capital of Afghanistan: Kabul.

Distributed in a dozen camps in Kabul (and another in the city of Mazar-e-Sharif in the north), the new rotation is commanded by Colonel Roch Pelletier.

In the coming weeks, 45eNord.ca will visit each camp in which Canadians are:

• Camp Phoenix is the headquarters of the Canadian Contribution Training Mission - Afghanistan.
• Camp Blackhorse , the Centre consolidated commissioning. It is here that are formed kandaks , units of the size of a battalion of infantry, combat support, combat service support and route clearance for operational service.
• New stadium in Kabul , this is where the Academy of Medical Sciences of the armed forces (ASMFA). Canadians notify the clinical level and develop leadership in place.
• At the Kabul International Airport North , is the School of Afghan Air Force where Canadians are consultants that support instruction and mentors Afghan cadre.
• The Regional Military Training Centre - North is located at Camp Mike Spann in Mazar-e-Sharif. A team of Canadian Forces medical help establish a sustainable medical capacity within the Afghan National Security Forces.
• Camp Julien , the Centre for Literacy of Darulaman. 1400 Afghan can be accommodated at any time Canadians have established a Training Advisory Team.
• At Camp Alamo is the Military Training Centre in Kabul, which is the main training center for the Afghan National Army. The contingent of Canadian military to provide support Command Team and Afghan instructors.
• Finally, Camp Eggers is the headquarters of the training mission in Afghanistan, where NATO is a large contingent of Canadians whose mission commander training Canadian Major-General Jim Ferron, who also serves as Deputy Commander - Operations NATO mission.

Afghanistan: withdrawal maximum security

The planned withdrawal of the French armies engaged in Afghanistan since 2008, is accelerating. More than 2000 men and 2000 tons of material have already left the country. To perform this maneuver logistics to its end, or the summer of 2013, freedom of action and security areas are essential.

The process of lightening the French forces began in 2011. In May 2012, François Hollande, president and army chief, calls for the acceleration of the movement. During the year 2012, the armies proceeded to withdraw about 2,100 troops and 2,000 tons of equipment. To allow convoys reach Kabul, security zones and areas is a key element. A security driven primarily by Task Force La Fayette 6 (TFLF 6) , commanded by Brigadier-Hautecloque Raysz between April 14 and November 25, 2012, and composed of groupings arms tactics (CATF) Steel , Wild Geese and Helicopter Battalion 

From May to July, tactical operations chained themselves to maintain the security of the axis Vermont, only practicable route between Kabul and Tagab. In April, " the insurgency led harassment actions in the area of Tagab , "says Colonel LAROUZIERE, commander GTIA Steel. Before starting the withdrawal of Tagab, sub-GTIA Tagab and Nijrab supported combat operations to the Afghan National Army (ANA), in Kapisa. The goal: to create a bubble of security around the FOB to perform the removal in a safe manner optimal. "  In five months, forty operations were mounted and we went more than thirty times in the fire , "says Captain H., unit commander of the sub-GTIA Tagab. And Colonel LAROUZIERE added: "  We were in contact to disrupt the insurgency and disrupt. While leading the ANA twenty-two transactions per month, we took over. "

Mid-August, 700 men did sometimes two trains per day, with the support of helicopters to carry the material to Nijrab or Kabul. Two hundred and fifty containers of about 10 tons each and armored vehicles (each representing an ATU unit to transport) passed on the axis Vermont.

Maneuver transport back to the men of Logistics Battalion (BATLOG) in Kabul. To Colonel Lawrence, Deputy Joint Support, " such a move log has not been conducted since the operation Daguet. " In mid-October, 350 UAT had reached Kabul.

The transit area of Kabul is the point of entry and exit of equipment. "  In the morning, we organize training convoy leaving empty containers to retrieve the Nijrab FOB. Simultaneously, another convoy full one, leaving the transit area to get to the storage area on the Kabul airport. This 2 to 3 times per day with a minimum of 6 to 8 vehicles. To protect logistics trucks, we need tanks and fighters , "says Captain B., the platoon commander and handling. Each vehicle and equipment "silcenté", that is to say, numbered " the SILCENT, centralized logistics information system, used to identify each package with a tracking computer  , "says Captain B.

The sub-group service adapted to the theater is responsible for "unequip" armored vehicles operational equipment (nets antiroquette, jammers ...). Then all vehicles, equipment and containers are deratted, bugged and disinfected. "  This plan will mastery of operational health is binding not import diseases in France  , "says Colonel Lawrence.

After this tactic loop, a loop is set up strategic. Afghanistan has no coastline. "  The air is the safest and fastest  , "says Col. Lawrence. Sensitive equipment or rare (aircraft parts, medical equipment ...) Antonov flies out to join France. The rest of the cargo is sent to a port in the Persian Gulf. It will join the cargo France by sea within 2 to 8 weeks. Since 1 ^st May, 262 rotations allowed the repatriation of equipment and personnel. 

In the summer of 2013, France will have achieved its goal. Force of International Security Assistance will include about 500 French soldiers against 3600 to 1 ^st January 2012. They will continue their mission in the detachment Epidote, hospital medical-surgical French military, the military airport in Kabul and international staffs of NATO.

Bye bye Kabul: the story of the French disengagement

REPORT to KABUL | The last flight of French fighting forces left Kabul. It will take six months to repatriate all 1200 vehicles and containers as much of the French army.

In order. But no battle disengagement, according the semantic precision of the military.

Do not tell them that the coalition of forty-seven NATO countries will never overcome these insurgents of all stripes beard. International jihadists, Taliban local interests and objectives fuzzy variables, Mujahideen hardened by a life of war, here are the masters of the majestic mountains and rocky valleys.

" The insurgents have still picked up well. The average age of Taliban commanders has dropped from 31 to 27 years , "says an officer, without being able to check the reliability of the statistical deadly. And interest because it is better to go to the old to negotiate rather than young dogs crazy. It adds a slightly bitter observation: " It was the right time to go. For them and for us. Before the Afghans see us as enemy aliens, as the occupier. "

The French leave (pictured, a convoy carrying VAB to the storage area of Kabul airport) and the future of Afghanistan remains unresolved. " The region was occupied by the French (district of Surobi and Kapisa) is now led by the Afghan National Army (ANA). And the insurgents have not taken the hand. This is evidence of their effectiveness , "says Colonel Antonelli, head of the training mission Epidote.

Further down in ranks, we find less convinced. " The Afghan soldiers are tough but the evil I do not give them five years before getting to defend Kabul , "said Master Corporal Loïc original douaisienne. Camp Warehouse, east of Kabul, where are grouped the ultimate French forces, "the leader" of poker or karaoke evenings of the 1st company of the 35th Infantry Regiment Belfort would have stayed a few more months. For compensation multiplied by more than two according to rank and marital status, and not subject to income tax ...

To the exit from the death of Osama bin Laden

But we must return one day. Eleven years after the first steps of special forces or agents of the DGSE on Afghan soil. War must have a meaning. This is the output from the death of bin Laden in May 2011.

The French army has gained a technological leap (the lattice to surveillance drone) and hardening in a country hostile group. She lost 88 men. It is not. This is huge.

In this bright and glossy Sunday in December on the plateau of Kabul (1800 m), Warrant Officer Denis, of the 16th Infantry Battalion of Bitche, thirty-two years in the army in counter is not angry to return home with two hundred comrades Fire Task Force La Fayette. They just spent seven months in Kapisa. They closed the forward base of Tagab September 30, the Nijrab November 25. The guys will be able to steel battalion blow.

" The pressure Tagab was permanent. But the man gets used to everything. As the camp was on a slope, there were three tracks discovered that avoided taking. It is still made ​​"ICT-er" several times , "says the sergeant at the foot of the A340 of Air Force departure. An ICT in NATO jargon, it is a snap (French acronym for Troops in Contact ).

A professional army does not fight an army insensitive. If the closure of the forward bases have generally passed without incident, the sergeant Denis remembers the departure of Tagab: " At the end of the village, a pilot VAB (armored vehicle from the front) has seen him right a rocket. He said : "It is for me. Just when we leave." Fortunately, it was at the end of the race and its sting incandescent collided at the bottom of the box. A little higher and it was good. "

The driver needed to speak, made ​​of chargepar shrinks. The post-traumatic syndrome can be an enemy soldier inside the back of OPEX (external operation). The decompression chamber to Paphos in Cyprus has been created for it. Three days to relax in a comfortable hotel - " five stars here, two star Palavas "- to regain its footing with normal life -" it's very funny, a shower and toilet in the room! "- to speak group with experts ...

This is where we discovered the silent suffering of men who were inside the VAB to Tagab. Unlike the pilot, they had not seen the rocket fall on their vehicle. They slept in more ...

" When we closed Nijrab was a sort of pre-sas after Tagab pleasant Warrant Officer Denis. Warehouse camp in Kabul, it was almost the holidays. Now Paphos. According to those who have already passed, it is a good thing. It allows to decompress, to ask before returning to the family. "Normal life.

During this time in Kabul, meticulous repatriation of equipment continues. Intensely. With two or three jumbo Antonov day by rushing into their mouths gyms flying the VAB VBCI, Caesar cannons, helicopters ... Specialists Air Detachment Kabul airport feel in time: half of 1200 vehicles and containers that leave much to France. In order.

IS LIGHTER

ELEVEN YEARS OF WAR

Attacks of September 11, 2001: Nearly 3,000 victims.

October 7, 2001: start of Operation Enduring Freedom, the pursuit of Osama bin Laden.

20 December 2001: beginning of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under NATO command in 2003.

October 9, 2004: the first democratic presidential election in Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai is elected.

May 2, 2011: Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda was killed by U.S. commandos in Abbottabad, Pakistan.

Yankees 4 DEAD

David Poulain (Halluin) Corporal 1st RPIMA, killed by hostile fire in the area of ​​Helmand Bruno Fauquembergue (Lille), Chief Warrant Officer CFT in Kabul, Lionel Knight (St-Pol-sur-Mer ), Corporal of the 35th RI, killed in Tagab in an accident with his weapon Denis Estin (Douai), the 93rd Chief Warrant Officer RAM, killed by a shot Gwan "Green on blue."

550

The number of soldiers suffering psychological problems related to their mission in Afghanistan, or 6-7% of staff, according to the Department of Health armies. The U.S. military estimates that figure to nearly 20%.

REMAINS?

At the end of the disengagement, there will only be 500 French soldiers in mid-2013, the command of the Kabul airport, hospital medical-surgical Role 3, Epidote and training in various ISAF HQ.

PERFORMERS

Afghans who worked with the French army (including interpreters) and are "direct threat" to their country will be welcomed in France (case by case study of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Afghanistan: defense chief does not preclude a Belgian presence in Kunduz to Christmas 2013

The Head of National Defence, General Gerard Van Caelenberge has not formally excluded that Belgian soldiers are still present in Kunduz in northern Afghanistan in a year. Much will depend on the progress of the announced departure of the German military, he said Friday during a visit to the year-end Belgian troops in cee countries. The operation of the Belgian F-16 in Kandahar "will remain a very important mission," he added.

General is currently conducting a tour of Belgian forces deployed in Afghanistan to support them in this time of Christmas season spent away from their families. Friday, CHOD visited bases in Mazar-e-Sharif and Kandahar. On Saturday, he will Kunduz, where 125 Belgians form a battalion of the Afghan army. They will be there still next year? General Van Caelenberge excludes nothing for hours. Everything will depend on the progress of the announced departure of the German military, which controls operations in the region of Kunduz and protect the Belgian

military. Defence boss does not want to assume the consequences for Belgium this withdrawal. "It is difficult to say when we leave (Kunduz)." However, he recognized that departure of the Germans have a significant impact for the Belgians. "We have two options: either we stop we, or we will organize ourselves our protection." (KNS)

Already 181 widebody flights to evacuate 560 vehicles and 490 containers of Afghanistan

Apart from the two thousand soldiers repatriated since May 2012, 39% of equipment and vehicles involved in the first phase of withdrawal French regained the city. By the end of the year, this figure will increase to 48%. The second phase is expected to last six months and lead to the removal of another thousand soldiers.

Colonel Michel André, the second in command of the CMT ( center mutimodal transport , responsible for strategic liaison referrals in regard to Afghanistan, the CCPO, the CICLO and PAMIR), states that the cargo in question includes "2 680 units with 1,150 vehicles and 1,530 containers. "

According to him, during the last weeks of December and early January, "a major effort will be made ​​because the climatic conditions are optimal, cold room to load up the big carriers." These Antonov andBoeing 747 provide at KAIA start, now all transfer out of way in Afghanistan. "181 flights have already taken place from 20 to 30% of these flights (to repatriate sensitive cargo helicopters, ammunition ...) directly to France, the rest to the UAE" where the cargo is loaded on boats.

Recourse to the surface is still being considered. "Technically, it's ready" ensures Colonel André. But all negotiations between states that have not yet been completed, the use of these routes has still not materialized. However, the cabinet of the French Minister of Defense announced that the northern route via Uzbekistan, will be convoys tests.

These surface streets are threefold: 
- the way south to the ports of Pakistan (the cheapest route) 
- the way north through Kazakhstan air starting Kabul railway to the Baltic ports and sea 
- the Another way north via Uzbekistan: road to Mazar-i-Sharif, and railway and sea from the Baltic ports.

It is the company Daher, issued by the MinDef, which is responsible for the musical setting of this maneuver exfiltration freight.

End of the mission in Afghanistan for military Phalsbourg

The soldiers of the 1st regiment of "Phalsbourg gunships as well as the base defense Phalsbourg who were in Afghanistan have returned to Lorraine.

The Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian embarked Saturday night from Paphos airport, Cyprus, aboard Flight 153 military repatriating French soldiers engaged in Afghanistan. Among them were men of the 1st regiment of combat helicopters and men Phalsbourg base defense Phalsbourg.

1st Regiment gunships Phalsbourg

Assessment of Engagement in Afghanistan

1 RHC was hired four times in Afghanistan. It was the first helicopter regiment to set foot in the Afghan theater and who led the operation of disengagement on the same theater. The first elements of the Light Aviation of the Army (ALT) have gained a foothold in Afghanistan in 2007. In September 2008, the first from the RHC, the first French helicopter gunships have been designed in the Afghan theater at 3 Gazelle Viviane. This detachment, engaged for a period of six months, was the forerunner of the 8 other mandates ALT who succeeded until December 2012. 1 RHC was again engaged in 2010 from June to December. In 2012, from June to December, the first RHC has the last battalion armed helicopters. After these many commitments, will lead the first RHC in more than 5000 flight hours, more than 1,700 missions, including more than 140 medical evacuations, thus evacuating more than 200 wounded French soldiers and Afghan civilians, including women and children. He has been involved in more than 100 shares of fire, delivering around 30 missiles and Hot 8,000 rounds of 30 mm.

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Base defense Phalsbourg

Historical

Base defense (DB) Phalsbourg was created on 1 January 2011. It is a geographical grouping within its scope all formations and agencies of the Ministry of Defence in Moselle.

Assessment of Engagement in Afghanistan

As all military personnel, who serves GSBdD is projectable in operations in his specialty. During these 12 months, 31 soldiers were projected in Afghanistan on two different mandates, reinforcements GTIA Surobi, then the reinforcement in Kapisa.